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We lay the groundwork for a formal framework that studies scientific theories and can serve
as a unified foundation for the different theories within physics. We define a scientific theory
as a set of verifiable statements, assertions that can be shown to be true with an experimental
test in finite time. By studying the algebra of such objects, we show that verifiability already
provides severe constraints. In particular, it requires that a set of physically distinguishable cases is
naturally equipped with the mathematical structures (i.e. second-countable Kolmogorov topologies
and σ-algebras) that form the foundation of manifold theory, differential geometry, measure theory,
probability theory and all the major branches of mathematics currently used in physics. This gives
a clear physical meaning to those mathematical structures and provides a strong justification for
their use in science. Most importantly it provides a formal framework to incorporate additional
assumptions and constrain the search space for new physical theories.
I. INTRODUCTION
When considering physics as a discipline, one cannot
help but notice that it is essentially composed of different
theories and models loosely connected to each other, each
with its own starting points and realm of applicability.
Classical mechanics, electromagnetism, general relativ-
ity, quantum mechanics, thermodynamics and so on may
share some general ideas but, in the end, they all have
their own separate foundation, either in a different set of
laws and principles or simply in positing a unique math-
ematical structure. This state of affairs is so entrenched
in our field it somehow feels like the proper, if not the
only, approach. But is it? Or does this approach actually
hinder progress and understanding?
We can gain perspective by comparing to different
fields of science and engineering. For example, in
computer science theory one starts by defining sym-
bolic languages and computational devices [1] and then
shows that no algorithm exists that can correctly decide
whether an arbitrary program terminates given an ar-
bitrary input [2]. In communication theory one defines
channels and the information they carry [3] and proves
general results such as calculating the maximum rate
at which information can be transmitted over a chan-
nel given a set amount of noise [4]. In control theory
one defines a system in terms of state, inputs and out-
puts [5] and then looks for general strategies for control
such as Kalman filtering [6]. These theories, with their
respective mathematical structures and results, are gen-
eral in the sense that they apply to all control systems, all
communication systems and all computational devices.
More specific topics in each field are constructed by fur-
ther constraining those general mathematical structures.
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In other words, the subject matter has been properly
defined formally and therefore the results follow simply
from the mere definition of the problem.
In physics there is no equivalent. Classical mechanics,
thermodynamics and quantum mechanics are not specific
topics within some more general formal theory. But how
would that work? As in the other general theories, we
need to clarify what our starting points are and let the
logic follow. The first requirement of a physical theory,
or rather of any scientific theory in general, is that it is
experimentally testable. So we would start by character-
izing the properties and limitations of experimental veri-
fication. The second requirement, which is where physics
starts, is identifying states and processes. After those
are characterized in general, we can then specialize them
for different cases. Some processes will be deterministic
and reversible. Some processes will be non-deterministic
and some will have equilibria. Some states can be broken
into parts and some cannot. By adding different assump-
tions on states and processes we would recover classical
Hamiltonian mechanics in one case, quantum mechan-
ics in another and thermodynamics in yet another. In all
these theories, some basic properties will be common sim-
ply because states need to be identified experimentally,
and some properties will be different because the type of
state or the type of process is different. This is what we
mean by a general mathematical theory of experimental
science.
Such a general theory would force us to clarify our
assumptions, thus the realm of applicability of each the-
ory. It would always put physics at the center of our dis-
cussion, as physical ideas are the starting point for our
formal framework and not after-the-fact interpretations.
It would give science sturdier mathematical grounds, as
each mathematical symbol is given a precise meaning
and non-physical objects are excluded by construction.
It would foster connections between different fields of
knowledge: nature does not care about such divisions.
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FIG. 1. Overall structure for a general mathematical theory
of experimental science. The starting point is experimental
verification. States and processes are particular types of ex-
perimentally testable objects. Different theories in physics
describe particular states under particular processes.
It would provide a framework in which to pose new ques-
tions and solve old ones. In other words: it would pro-
vide a better foundation for physics and for the rest of
the sciences. Developing a general mathematical the-
ory for experimental science could be compared to what
happened in mathematics during the first half of the last
century, when it was reorganized using logic and set the-
ory as its foundation, which had profound repercussions
in the field. Our preliminary work in both physics [7]
and math [8] convinced us that such a goal is possible
and within reach.
The aim of the present work is to lay down the be-
ginning of a general mathematical theory of experimen-
tal science, limited to the part concerning experimental
verification. We start by defining verifiable statements:
assertions whose truth can be verified experimentally in
finite time. We study the logic of these statements, which
is different from the standard Boolean logic because of fi-
nite time termination. We define experimental domains
as a collection of verifiable statements that, if given an
indefinite amount of time, we can keep testing, forever
refining our knowledge. From each experimental domain
we construct its possibilities: the different cases we can
experimentally distinguish. The main result is that each
set of experimentally distinguishable possibilities
comes equipped with a natural second-countable
Kolmogorov topology, where each open set cor-
responds to a verifiable statement, and a natural
σ-algebra, where each Borel set corresponds to a
theoretical statement which gives predictions for
verifiable ones. For example, “the mass of the parti-
cle is more than 0.4 and less than 0.6 MeV” is a ver-
ifiable statement precisely because (0.4,0.6) is an open
set, while “the mass of the particle is exactly 0.5 MeV”
is not verifiable because [0.5,0.5] is not an open set.[9]
From that general result we can derive the following con-
clusion: any set of physically distinguishable cases
has at most cardinality of the continuum. That is,
the only thing we can do to distinguish a particular case is
run the tests for a countable set of statements, the output
of which can be imagined as a countable sequence of true
and false. This is equivalent to the binary representation
of a real number. In a nutshell, experimental verifica-
tion by itself guarantees us the existence of two
mathematical structures that are the foundations
of most tools used in physics, such as differential
geometry (Riemannian and symplectic), measure theory,
probability theory and many others.
While this result is remarkable by itself, the most in-
teresting aspect is that it can be used as a cornerstone
for a more general theory. Conceptually, in the same way
that topological spaces keep track of what can be veri-
fied experimentally, manifolds keep track of objects that
can be identified by continuous quantities, differentiable
manifolds keep track of objects that allow a density to be
defined over them and symplectic manifolds (i.e. phase
space of classical mechanics) allow the density to be co-
ordinate invariant (i.e. observer independent). By doing
all this work formally we will be forced to recognize the
assumptions that go into those structures, and under-
stand if and how they fail. For example, we are currently
in the process of identifying the necessary and sufficient
conditions such that a set of verifiable statements de-
fines a continuous quantity. While, as one would expect,
these can only correspond to an idealized case where one
pretends a better precision measurement can always be
achieved, they also tell us precisely how this idealized
case fails which can be relevant to work on Planck scale
physics. But whatever other tools we will have in that
case, we know we will always have at least a topology
and a σ-algebra.
As another example, note that the set of discontinuous
functions from R to R has cardinality greater than the
continuum and therefore cannot represent a set of physi-
cally distinguishable objects. This means that the square
integrable space of functions typically used in quantum
mechanics is far too big, and, in fact, it contains unphys-
ical elements, such as states with infinite energy. How-
ever, the Schwartz space, like the set of continuous func-
tions, has cardinality of the continuum and can be given
a second-countable Kolmogorov topology.[10] To our un-
derstanding, the reason why Hilbert spaces are mathe-
matically useful is because one can take limits and use
the vector space norm to converge. However, we may
instead be able to use the corresponding σ-algebra to
take limits, like one does in probability and measure the-
ory. In other words, we may be able to construct, within
this framework, a more mathematically sound and phys-
ically motivated foundation for quantum mechanics that
includes the objects and only the objects that are physi-
cally meaningful.
As a last example, we also believe we can form a con-
nection to computer science. We can characterize the
output of a computational device as a set of verifiable
statements (e.g. “the third bit of output is 1”) that are
a function of the input, which can also be characterized
as verifiable statements (e.g. “the second bit of the input
is 0”). In this context, all possible inputs form the pos-
sibilities of our space, as they define all possible outputs
of the computation. Now suppose we have a function
from the input to a Boolean value. Then we can write
3the statements “the input is such that the output of the
function is true” and “the input is such that the output
of the function is false”. If both these statements corre-
spond to open sets on the possible inputs then they are
verifiable statements and we construct a test (i.e. a pro-
gram) that will always terminate. That is, we can com-
bine tools from topology and computer science to answer
a question of the type: is this scientific problem testable
or computable? In a similar way, connections to informa-
tion theory can also be established: a deterministic and
reversible process, in fact, is one for which description of
the input is equivalent to the description of the output,
which means information entropy is conserved. These
links illustrate the potential as a theory of experimental
science, and not just physics.
We hope that it is clear by now that a general mathe-
matical theory of experimental science is missing, is pos-
sible and would be extremely useful. Whether you work
on condensed matter, quantum thermodynamics, com-
plex systems, particle physics, gravitation or grand uni-
fied theories, if what you are doing is science you will
have, at some point, experimental verification. You will
have problems (often the most interesting ones) that arise
from questions such as: what is it that I can measure?
How do I do it? Under what assumptions do the quanti-
ties in my theory map to those measurements? When are
they even well defined? What can I compute within my
theory? What is testable? Currently, you do not have a
general framework to pose those questions. And it turns
out you do not need a completely ad-hoc one for your
specific field. The mere logic of experimental verification
requires a particular structure. And there is a lot more
to experimental verification than its logic: the quantity
itself has to, at least in a sense, exist over a finite period
of time to be measurable, there must exist a process to
transfer that information to a measurement device, the
system cannot be assumed to be always completely iso-
lated as it would not be physically accessible. If you are
working on foundational aspects, chances are you may
already be thinking about some of these issues as they
relate to your field. But what parts of those problems are
specific to your field? How much can be treated generally,
so that not only each field has less work to do but also we
have a common language across fields? What are the as-
sumptions specific to your field and those that are more
general? A general mathematical theory of experimental
science would provide you with a formal framework to
precisely pose and possibly answer those questions. As
the starting points are clarified, the foundations of differ-
ent fields may be affected, or even partially integrated,
and potentially change how they are taught as well.
The irony is that while the project is extremely am-
bitious, the biggest obstacles are not, at this point,
technical. The biggest obstacles are sociological. On
one side the nature of this work is extremely interdisci-
plinary. On the other side math and physics are divided
into fields and sub-fields that are increasingly narrow.[11]
This means that this work does not fit naturally within
any community while requiring technical expertise from
many. To obviate these problems, borrowing practices
from the open source software community, we are devel-
oping our main body of work in the open [12], so that we
can address the topic in its entirety, and our colleagues in
philosophy, mathematics and physics can all check their
respective parts. This article is the product of that pro-
cess and focuses on current results of greater interest to
physicists, omitting more mathematical and philosophi-
cal details that can be found in the broader work.
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF SCIENTIFIC
OBJECTIVITY
As the starting point of our general theory, we intro-
duce the following guiding principle:
Principle of scientific objectivity. Science is univer-
sal, non-contradictory and evidence based.
This means that science concerns itself only to the
study of assertions that have a well defined truth value
which can be verified experimentally. The issue at hand
is to formally capture this informal intuition. We begin
with the following common definition.
Definition II.1. The Boolean domain is the set B =
{false,true} of all possible truth values.
Next we need to define our truth bearer. In math-
ematical logic, this is typically a well formed formula.
This cannot work for us: what we are interested in is the
meaning of the assertion and not how it is expressed. For
example, “this animal is a dog” and “questo animale e`
un cane” represent the same fact expressed in different
languages. As science is universal, it should not mat-
ter the language, units or reference system used to make
an assertion.[13] While we will still use standard math-
ematics for the formal system, we introduce a variation
of algebraic logic to represent our “informal” assertions.
We start by defining our truth bearer as:
Axiom II.2. A statement s is an assertion that is ei-
ther true or false. Formally, a statement is an element
of the set S of all statements upon which is defined a
function truth ∶ S → B that returns the truth value for
each element.
Note how the first part of the definition captures the
informal meaning of what we are describing, while the
second part captures the part that is formalized. This
pattern will be present in most of our definitions and it
serves to clarify both what is being formalized and how.
Therefore, in science, the statement is an assertion while
for the math it is just an element in some set.
While in math the truth value is the focus of the logic
system, in science it is generally established experimen-
tally. But our scientific model may constrain certain
statements or statement combinations to be ruled out.
4For example, the statements “this animal is a dog” and
“this animal is a cat” can both be either true or false,
but the statement “this animal is a cat and a dog” can
never be true. That is, the role of our logic system is
not to keep track of what is true and false, but of what
cannot possibly be true and cannot possibly be false. We
need to keep track of these relationships so that we can
never have inconsistencies or paradoxes.
Definition II.3. Given a collection of statements
{si}
n
i=1, a consistent truth assignment is a collection
of truth values {ti}
n
i=1 such that it is logically consis-
tent to simultaneously suppose that truth(si) = ti for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n. That is, from those assumptions it cannot
be proven that truth(si) ≠ ti for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n. This
definition generalizes to the case of infinite, possibly un-
countable, indexed families.
Note that the truth assignments are just hypotheti-
cals. They are not actual physical entities. There is only
one truth value, the one found experimentally. Logical
consistency is defined on the truth assignments and not
on the truth values. Therefore we need a way to track
whether the meaning of each statement allows it to be
true or not.
Axiom II.4. The possibilities of a statement s are
the possible truth values allowed by the content of the
statement. Formally, on S is also defined a function
poss ∶ S → {{false,true},{false},{true}} such that:
• truth(s) ∈ poss(s) for all s ∈ S. This remains valid
in every consistent truth assignment.
• for any collection of statements {si}
n
i=1, for any
1 ≤ j ≤ n and for any t ∈ poss(sj) there exists a
consistent truth assignment {ti}
n
i=1 such that tj = t.
This generalizes to the case of infinite, possibly un-
countable, indexed families.
With this axiom, we can distinguish between state-
ments that can never be true and those that just happen
to be true.
Definition II.5. A tautology ⊺ is a statement that
must be true simply because of its content. That is,
poss(⊺) = {true}.
Definition II.6. A contradiction  is a statement that
must be false simply because of its content. That is,
poss() = {false}.
We also need to express relationships between the truth
of different statements. For example, if we assign true to
“this animal is a dog” then we cannot assign true to
“this animal is not a dog”. Therefore we introduce the
following:
Axiom II.7. We can always construct a statement
whose truth value arbitrarily depends on an arbitrary set
of statements. Formally, given an arbitrary truth func-
tion fB ∶ B
n → B there exists a function f ∶ Sn → S such
that
truth(f(s1, ..., sn)) = fB(truth(s1), ..., truth(sn))
and the same relationship remains valid in every con-
sistent truth assignment. This also holds in the case of
infinite, possibly uncountable, arguments.
We will use the standard symbols ¬, ∧, ∨ to indicate
the negation (logical NOT), conjunction (logical AND)
and disjunction (logical OR). With these three axioms,
we can rederive all of the rules of classical logic. First we
define our equivalence.
Definition II.8. Two statements s1 and s2 are equiv-
alent s1 ≡ s2 if they must be equally true or false simply
because of their content. Formally, s1 ≡ s2 if and only if
(s1 ∧ s2) ∨ (¬s1 ∧ ¬s2) is a tautology.
From this definition, one can prove that two statements
are equivalent if and only if they have the same truth in
all consistent truth assignments. From that one can prove
the following two propositions.
Proposition II.9. Statement equivalence satisfies the
following properties:
• reflexivity: s ≡ s
• symmetry: if s1 ≡ s2 then s2 ≡ s1
• transitivity: if s1 ≡ s2 and s2 ≡ s3 then s1 ≡ s3
and is therefore an equivalence relationship.
Proposition II.10. The set of all statements S satisfies
the following properties:
• associativity: a ∨ (b ∨ c) ≡ (a ∨ b) ∨ c, a ∧ (b ∧ c) ≡
(a ∧ b) ∧ c
• commutativity: a ∨ b ≡ b ∨ a, a ∧ b ≡ b ∧ a
• absorption: a ∨ (a ∧ b) ≡ a, a ∧ (a ∨ b) ≡ a
• identity: a ∨  ≡ a, a ∧ ⊺ ≡ a
• distributivity: a∨(b∧c) ≡ (a∨b)∧(a∨c), a∧(b∨c) ≡
(a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c)
• complements: a ∨ ¬a ≡ ⊺, a ∧ ¬a ≡ 
• De Morgan: ¬a ∨ ¬b ≡ ¬(a ∧ b), ¬a ∧ ¬b ≡ ¬(a ∨ b)
This, by definition, means S is a Boolean algebra.
One can also prove that the Boolean algebra is com-
plete, and therefore it generalizes to the infinite case.
This system not only allows us to use formal classical
logic while keeping the statements informal, but is also
equipped to capture causal relationships.[14] For exam-
ple, s1 =“the thermometer indicator is between 24 C and
25 C” and s2 =“the temperature is between 24 C and 25
C” are equivalent because both s1 ∧ ¬s2 and ¬s1 ∧ s2 are
contradictions (on the assumption that our thermometer
is actually working). We can also define other semantic
relationships.
Definition II.11. Given two statements s1 and s2, we
say that:
• s1 is narrower than s2 (noted s1 ≼ s2) if s2 is true
whenever s1 is true simply because of their content.
That is, s1 ∧ ¬s2 ≡ .
5• s1 is broader than s2 (noted s1 ≽ s2) if s2 ≼ s1.
• s1 is compatible to s2 (noted s1  s2) if their
content allows them to be true at the same time.
That is, s1 ∧ s2 ≢ .
The negation of these properties will be noted by ⋠, ⋡ ,
 respectively.
Definition II.12. The elements of a set of statements
S ⊆ S are said to be independent (noted s1 upmodels s2 for a
set of two) if their content is such that any combination
of their possibilities is allowed. That is, poss(f(S)) =
f(⨉
s∈S
poss(s)) for any truth function f ∶ B∣S∣ → B. The
negation of independence will be noted by upmodels_uni0338.
For example, given the following statements:
: s1 =“that animal is a cat”
: s2 =“that animal is a mammal”
: s3 =“that animal is a dog”
: s4 =“that animal is black”
we have the s1 ≼ s2 (i.e. it is more specific), s1  s3 (i.e.
they cannot be true at the same time) and s1 upmodels s4 (i.e.
the truth of one tells us nothing about the truth of the
other).
Another interesting result is that statement narrow-
ness imposes a partial order on the set of all statements.
Proposition II.13. Statement narrowness satisfies the
following properties:
• reflexivity: s ≼ s
• antisymmetry: if s1 ≼ s2 and s2 ≼ s1 then s1 ≡ s2
• transitivity: if s1 ≼ s2 and s2 ≼ s3 then s1 ≼ s3
and is therefore a partial order.
As every element in our general theory will be con-
structed upon statements, these operations are important
as they will characterize all those constructions. For ex-
ample, if we quantify the precision of a set of statements,
it will need to be ordered in a way that is compatible
with narrowness. If we define statistical independence, it
will have to be defined in a way that is compatible with
statement independence. In the same way that set the-
ory defines concepts common across all mathematics, the
general theory defines basic concepts that are common to
all scientific theories.
III. VERIFIABLE STATEMENTS AND
EXPERIMENTAL DOMAINS
We have the tools for dealing with assertions that are
universal and non-contradictory, now we have to develop
the tools for those that are evidence based as well.
Axiom III.1. A verifiable statement is a statement
that can be shown to be true experimentally. Formally, a
statement s is verifiable if it is part of the subset s ∈ Sv ⊂ S
of all verifiable statements.
Physically, this means that we have a repeatable pro-
cedure that anybody can execute and that always gives
the same result. If the statement is true, then this ex-
perimental test must terminate successfully. Note that,
in general, the test may not terminate if the statement
is false. Consider the following:
1. find a swan
2. if it is black terminate successfully
3. go to step 1
This will terminate if a black swan is found, but it will not
terminate if no black swans exist (i.e. absence of evidence
is not evidence of absence). Because of non-termination,
failure to verify is not verification of the negation. That
is, the negation of a verifiable statement is not necessarily
a verifiable statement.
Given two statements, though, we can verify their con-
junction simply by verifying both: if they are both true,
both their tests will terminate and verify the conjunction.
But we cannot extend this to an infinite number of state-
ments as we would never terminate. We can also verify
the disjunction of two statements: once one test termi-
nates we are done. And because we only need one test
to terminate, we can generalize to a countable number of
verifiable statements by following this procedure:
1. initialize n to 1
2. for each i = 1..n
(a) run the test for si for n seconds
(b) if it terminates successfully then terminate
successfully
3. increment n and go to step 2
This procedure will run all tests for an arbitrary amount
of time. Therefore, if one statement is true, it will make
the test terminate successfully, even if all other tests
would never terminate. In light of this, we can set the
following axioms.
Axiom III.2. The conjunction of a finite collection of
verifiable statements is a verifiable statement. Formally,
let {si}
n
i=1 ⊆ Sv be a finite collection of verifiable state-
ments. Then the conjunction
n
⋀
i=1
si ∈ Sv is a verifiable
statement.
Axiom III.3. The disjunction of a countable collection
of verifiable statements is a verifiable statement. For-
mally, let {si}
∞
i=1 ⊆ Sv be a countable collection of ver-
ifiable statements. Then the disjunction
∞
⋁
i=1
si ∈ Sv is a
verifiable statement.
We could also define decidable statements as those for
which falsehood can also be tested experimentally. Table
I compares the different algebras.
Now that we can verify statements one by one, we need
to define what it means to verify a group of them. In prin-
ciple, given a set of verifiable statements we can simply
6Operator Gate Statement Verifiable Statement Decidable Statement
Negation NOT allowed disallowed allowed
Conjunction AND arbitrary finite finite
Disjunction OR arbitrary countable finite
TABLE I. Comparing algebras of statements.
start testing them one after the other. However, if we
are given a set of uncountable statements then, even if
we have an indefinitely long time at our disposal, we will
not be able to create a procedure that eventually tests
all statements. However, we may not need to actually
run all tests for all statements. For example, if we found
that s1 is true then there is no need to test any of its
disjunctions like s1 ∨ s2.
Definition III.4. Given a set D of verifiable statements,
B ⊆ D is a basis if the truth values of B are enough to
deduce the truth values of the set. Formally, all elements
of D can be generated from B using finite conjunction
and countable disjunction.
Therefore it is the size of the basis that matters and
not the size of the set. If the basis is countable we can
keep going and, if any statement is true, it will eventually
be verified experimentally.[15]
Definition III.5. An experimental domain D repre-
sents all the experimental evidence that can be acquired
about a scientific subject in an indefinite amount of time.
Formally, it is a set of statements, closed under finite
conjunction and countable disjunction, that includes pre-
cisely the tautology, the contradiction, and a set of veri-
fiable statements that can be generated from a countable
basis.
These axioms and definitions formally characterize
what we mean by evidence based. A scientific theory
will be fully defined by a countable set of verifiable state-
ments, the basis for an experimental domain.
IV. THEORETICAL DOMAINS AND
POSSIBILITIES
While verifiable statements define what can be scien-
tifically studied, not all interesting scientific statements
are directly verifiable. Consider the two statements
“there exists extra-terrestrial life” and “there is no extra-
terrestrial life”. We can verify the first if we happen to
find signs of life somewhere, but experimentally verifying
the second is practically impossible. Yet, the second is
still meaningful as a prediction: it predicts that the test
for the first will never terminate. That is, while negations
are not verifiable we can still logically talk about them
when, for example, constructing truth assignments.
Definition IV.1. The theoretical domain D¯ of an
experimental domain D is the set of statements that we
can use to state predictions, which is constructed from D
by allowing negation. We call theoretical statement
a statement that is part of a theoretical domain. More
formally, D¯ is the set of all statements generated from D
using negation, finite conjunction and countable disjunc-
tion.
Note that the new statements provide no new infor-
mation. In fact, all statements in the theoretical domain
D¯ can be generated by negation, countable conjunction
and countable disjunction from a basis B of D. As they
provide all possible predictions, we focus on the ones
that completely specify the truth value for all theoretical
statements. For example, once we know that “this ani-
mal is a cat” we know that “this animal has whiskers”,
that “this animal has no feathers” and so on.
Definition IV.2. A possibility for an experimental do-
main D is a statement x ∈ D¯ that, when true, determines
the truth value for all statements in the theoretical do-
main. Formally, x ≢  and for each s ∈ D¯, either x ≼ s or
x  s. The possibilities X for D are the collection of all
possibilities.
The possibilities are all the different cases that can be
distinguished experimentally given the verifiable state-
ments of the domain. If we increase or otherwise change
the set of verifiable statements (e.g. we learn how to test
the DNA of animals) then the possibilities will change as
well (e.g. the possible animal species are refined). We
conclude this section with the following general result.
Theorem IV.3. The possibilities X for an experimental
domain D have at most the cardinality of the continuum.
The proof is simply noting that each possibility can be
labeled by the truth value of the countable basis of the
experimental domain. We cannot have more possibilities
than sequences of true/false and the set of all binary
sequences has the cardinality of the continuum.
This means that we are never going to be able to ex-
perimentally distinguish between elements of greater car-
dinality. The set of topologically discontinuous functions
from R to R, for example, has greater cardinality and
therefore it will never be associated with any physically
distinguishable concept.[16] All the issues with large car-
dinals are not something science will ever be interested
in. It does not matter what system we are describing,
what experimental techniques we are using or how clever
we are.
7V. TOPOLOGIES AND SIGMA-ALGEBRAS
Now that we have introduced the basic mathemati-
cal structures for our general theory, we show their deep
connection to other well established mathematical struc-
tures. We first note that each verifiable statement can
be written as the disjunction of a set of possibilities.
Definition V.1. Let D be an experimental domain and
X its possibilities. We define the map U ∶ D → 2X that
for each statement s ∈ D returns the set of possibilities
compatible with it. That is, U(s) ≡ {x ∈ X ∣x  s}. We
call U(s) the verifiable set of possibilities associated
with s.
Proposition V.2. A statement s ∈ D is the disjunction
of the possibilities in its verifiable set U(s). That is, s =
⋁
x∈U(s)
x.
The proof is a trivial application of the disjunctive nor-
mal form of Boolean algebra. In fact, each possibility
can be written as a minterm of a basis (i.e. a conjunc-
tion where each basis element appears only once either
negated or not). Any verifiable statement can be ex-
pressed in terms of the basis, and it is a result of Boolean
algebra that each logical expression can be formulated as
a disjunction of minterms (i.e. an OR of ANDs). In-
tuitively, it is the disjunction of all cases in which the
statement is true.
Since every statement is a set of possibilities, we can
re-express the statement relationships in terms of set re-
lationships according to Table II.
The closure of an experimental domain under finite
conjunction and countable disjunction becomes closure
under finite intersection and countable union. Since the
basis is countable, countable union is equivalent to arbi-
trary union. In other words, the set of all verifiable sets
is a topology.
Theorem V.3. Let X be the set of possibilities for an
experimental domain D. X has a natural topology given
by the collection of all verifiable sets TX = U(D) that is
Kolmogorov and second countable.
The topology is Kolmogorov (i.e. T0) because given
two possibilities, by their construction, there must be one
element of the basis that is compatible with one but not
the other. It is second countable because a basis of the
experimental domain corresponds to a sub-basis of the
topology. One can also show that the natural topology
is Hausdorff if and only if all possibilities are approxi-
mately verifiable (i.e. each possibility is the limit of a
sequence of verifiable statements). The hope is that we
can find physically meaningful definitions for all relevant
topological concepts.
In the same way, the theoretical domain corresponds
to a σ-algebra on the possibilities.
Definition V.4. Let D¯ be a theoretical domain and X
its possibilities. We define the map A ∶ D¯ → 2X that for
each theoretical statement s ∈ D¯ returns the set of possi-
bilities compatible with it. That is, A(s) ≡ {x ∈ X ∣x  s}.
We call A(s) the theoretical set of possibilities associ-
ated with s
Theorem V.5. Let X be the set of possibilities for a
theoretical domain D¯. X has a natural σ-algebra given
by the collection of all theoretical sets ΣX = A(D¯).
The proof is again a simple mapping of statement op-
erations to set operations. It can also be shown that the
natural σ-algebra of the possibilities is the Borel algebra
of their natural topology.
VI. BRIEF DISCUSSION AND EXAMPLES
The connection we outlined creates a strong bridge
between the standard mathematical structures used in
physics and their meaning. Every theorem, every proof
on those structures can now be given a direct physical
meaning as well. And given the foundational nature of
topologies and σ-algebras, we can imagine extending this
framework to measure theory, differential geometry, sym-
plectic geometry, Riemannian geometry, probability the-
ory and so on.
To give an example of how it works, consider an ex-
perimental domain where the basis is composed of state-
ments like “this quantity is more than x but less than y”
where x and y are different values that can be arbitrarily
close. For example, “the distance between the earth and
the moon is more than 384 but less than 385 thousand
Km”. Each verifiable statement of the basis corresponds
to an open interval of the real line, therefore we find a cor-
respondence between arbitrary precision measurements
and the standard topology on the reals, as this is the
one generated by open intervals. Note, in fact, that this
topology is second-countable and at least Kolmogorov.
The possibilities (e.g. “the mass of the photon is pre-
cisely zero”) are not themselves verifiable since infinite
precision measurements of a continuous quantity are not
possible. Yet, their negation (i.e. “the mass of the photon
is not precisely zero”) could be verified in practice. This
is expressed mathematically by the fact that singletons
are closed sets. The theoretical domain, instead, cor-
responds to the standard Borel algebra, which includes
closed and half-open sets but not all possible sets of in-
tegers, many of which cannot be characterized by a well
formed formula.
Similarly, one can imagine verifiable statements for re-
lationships (e.g. “when the temperature of the mercury
column is between 24 and 25 C, its height is between 24
and 25 mm”) and for statistical variables (e.g. “if this
coin is tossed enough times, the fraction of heads will be
between 45% and 55%”). Ultimately the general theory
will need to show precisely what mathematical structures
map to experimental domains formed by statements of
these types and under what assumptions. But the idea
is that, once you have specified the verifiable statements
8Statement relationship Set relationship
s1 ∧ s2 (Conjunction) U(s1) ∩U(s2) (Intersection)
s1 ∨ s2 (Disjunction) U(s1) ∪U(s2) (Union)
¬s (Negation) U(s)C (Complement)
s1 ≡ s2 (Equivalence) U(s1) = U(s2) (Equality)
s1 ≼ s2 (Narrower than) U(s1) ⊆ U(s2) (Subset)
s1 ≽ s2 (Broader than) U(s1) ⊇ U(s2) (Superset)
s1  s2 (Compatibility) U(s1) ∩U(s2) ≠ ∅ (Intersection not empty)
TABLE II. Correspondence between statement operators and set operators.
and their logical relationships, you have already speci-
fied the experimental domain and nothing else needs to
be added. In other words: the points of the space and
their mathematical structures are fully specified
by what can be measured within the theory.
VII. CONCLUSION
Science is based on experimental verification. Experi-
mental verification has its own logic. This logic imposes a
mathematical structure which we characterized in terms
of experimental domains (collections of verifiable state-
ments), theoretical domains (collections of predictions for
verifiable statements) and possibilities (the cases that
can be distinguished experimentally). This mathemat-
ical structure leads naturally to topological spaces and
σ-algebras, the foundation of many of the tools used in
physics and science in general. Not only does this re-
sult clarify why those tools are so successful in science,
it provides a direct physical meaning to those structures
and a solid foundation upon which to create a general
mathematical theory of experimental science.
In this light, what is most remarkable about this work
is not its results, but that it can be done in the first
place. That there is a way to construct physical theo-
ries that forces us to spell out our physical assumptions,
and that clarifies in a rigorous way what result is a con-
sequence of what assumption. We can therefore ana-
lyze and compare new starting points with the discipline
and thoroughness of modern mathematics instead of just
rummaging through the bag of mathematical tools. But
to do that, we have to create a space in the scientific
community that is conducive to this kind of broad inter-
disciplinary work. We need generalists that can recognize
how a detail in measure theory relates to information en-
tropy or Hamiltonian mechanics. We need to take the
mathematical structures created by mathematicians for
their needs, break them apart and recombine them to
find mathematical structures most suited and meaning-
ful for science. Scientific knowledge has expanded quite
considerably in the last century, maybe it is time for a
moment of synthesis and consolidation.
We believe the development of a general mathematical
theory of experimental science would be an important
accomplishment for the scientific community and that it
would be beneficial in ways we cannot yet even imagine.
All we know is that a clearer understanding of our start-
ing points cannot but help to provide insights into the
current theories and suggest strategies to address long
standing problems.
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